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Late in the day on March 11, 2020, the Hungarian government issued Decree no. 40/2020, 
declaring a “state of danger”1 in the growing coronavirus pandemic.2 Soon after, on March 20, the 
Hungarian government submitted Bill T/97903 to Parliament, seeking parliamentary authorization 
to extend the effect of government decrees beyond the limits prescribed in the Fundamental Law 
— essentially, government decrees could be executed without parliamentary control under the 
pretext of public health protection. By March 30, the governing Fidesz party secured the requisite 
two-thirds majority of Parliament to approve the bill.4 The law entered into force immediately, and 
it faced extreme international criticism.5 
 
This Article will offer a brief background on the impact of COVID-19 in Hungary, the 
characteristics of the “coronavirus bill,” T/9790, and an overview of how international human 
rights law deals with states of emergency. This Article will then analyze the provisions of T/9790 
against international human rights law obligations as well as against Hungary’s Constitution by 
addressing the specific rights of freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and right to a fair 
trial. This Article considers whether, under both international treaties and the Constitution, 
Hungary has met its obligations to protect fundamental human rights during a state of emergency 
by enforcing T/9790. 
 
In June of 2020, the total number of confirmed coronavirus cases in Hungary stood at 4,027, with 
2,391 recoveries and 551 deaths.6 On March 11, the beginning of the state of danger, there was 
just one confirmed case.7 Hungary found itself in the middle of the pack of states hit by COVID-
19, trailing behind most Western European countries in its case count.8 
 
While facing fewer cases compared to neighboring European countries, Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán has taken the pandemic as an opportunity to consolidate government power indefinitely 
under the guise of a state of emergency. Orbán, a founding member of the anticommunist Fidesz 
party, was re-elected as prime minister in 2010.9 A self-described illiberal leader known for anti-
migrant rhetoric and severe economic austerity measures, Orbán has faced accusations of 
 
1 The Hungarian Constitution, known as the Fundamental Law, refers to a state of emergency as a “state of danger.” 
Magyarország Alaptörvénye [hereinafter “M.A.”], 53. cikk (Fundamental Law, art. 53). 
2 40/2020. (III. 11.) Korm. r. a Veszélyhelyzet Megállapításáról (Government Decree No. 40/2020 (III. 11.) on the 
Declaration of a State of Danger). 
3 2020. évi T/9790. törvényjavaslat a Koronavírus Elleni Védekezésről (Bill T/9790 of 2020 on Protection Against 
Coronavirus) [hereinafter “T/9790”]. States of danger are only effective for fifteen days unless extended for another 
fifteen days by a two-thirds parliamentary vote. 
4 Amnesty International, Hungary: Government Must Not Use Extraordinary Power to Roll Back Human Rights 
Amid COVID-19 Emergency, Public Statement (March 31, 2020), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/EUR-27-2046-2020-Amnesty-International-Public-statement-Hungary-COVID19-bill-
grants-the-government-extraordinary-power.pdf.  
5 2020. évi XII. törvény a Koronavírus Elszigetelése (Act XII of 2020 on Containment of Coronavirus). 
6 World Health Organization: Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, Hungary, 
https://covid19.who.int/region/euro/country/hu (last visited Jun 14, 2020, 1:57 PM). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Viktor Orbán, BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Viktor-Orban (last visited July 22, 2020). 
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authoritarianism from European leaders for a decade.10 Bill T/9790 grants him unchecked power 
to silence dissenting voices, especially in the media, and restrict the fundamental human rights of 
freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and the right to a fair trial, which international law 
protects. 
 
T/9790, or the Bill on Protection Against the Coronavirus, absolves the Hungarian government 
from parliamentary scrutiny during the declared state of emergency, effectively widening the 
government’s power to rule by decree.11 Neither the bill nor the decree declaring the state of danger 
has a defined end date, known as a sunset provision.12 Arguably more concerning, the bill enacts 
two new crimes related to the COVID-19 crisis. The first provision, amending the Hungarian 
Criminal Code, applies the crime of imparting or conveying false information “with a reckless 
disregard for its truth or falsity”13 to acts that “obstruct or frustrate” the successful protection of 
the public or might incite the public to action during the state of danger.14 This crime could be 
punished by up to five years in prison.15 The second provision states that any person who interferes 
with quarantine enforcement may be sentenced to up to three years in prison, five years if such an 
act is committed by a group, and eight years if anyone dies as a result of quarantine interference.16 
The bill does not elaborate on what defines false information, quarantine interference, or the 
successful protection of the public, leaving law enforcement broad discretion on how to apply 
T/9790. The bill also does not discuss any investigation or arrest meters, any rights of those 
suspected of violating the bill, or how the bill’s enforcement will not tread on the internationally 
protected rights of freedom of expression, the press, or right to a fair trial.  
 
Further, the bill allows the government to suspend the application of any law beyond the specific 
regulations listed in Act CXXVIII of 2011, the Management of Natural Disasters.17 The Act was 
intended to apply to forces of nature, but its language easily applies to national health crises.18 The 
Act lists specific rights that the government can suspend during a natural disaster, including the 
right to assemble in public, the right to travel, the right to property, and the right to education.19 
T/9790 allows for the erosion of more rights during this state of danger and places Hungary’s 
 
10 Id. 
11 T/9790 § 2; Hungary: Government Must Not Use Extraordinary Power to Roll Back Human Rights Amid COVID-
19 Emergency, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR2720462020ENGLISH.PDF (stating that T/9790 authorizes the 
Hungarian government to rule by decree with no clear cut-off date). 
12 Id. §§ 3, 8. 
13 2012. évi C. torvény a Büntető Törvénkykönyv, 337. cikk (Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, Article 337). 
14 T/9790 §§ 10(1), 10(2); Akos Keller-Alant, Hungarian Coronavirus Bill Will Have “Chilling Effect” on Media, 
BALKANINSIGHT (Mar. 26, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/26/hungarian-coronavirus-bill-will-have-
chilling-effect-on-media/ (reporting that T/9790 gives the Hungarian government authority to imprison anyone for 
spreading misinformation that obstructs efforts to combat the virus). 
15 T/9790 § 10(2). 
16 Id. § 10(1). 
17 T/9790 § (2)(1); 2011. évi CXXVIII. torvény a Katasztrófavédelemről és a Hozzá Kapcsolódó Egyes Törvények 
Módosításáról, 24. alfejezet (Act CXXVIII of 2011 on Disaster Protection and Amending Certain Related Laws, 
Subchapter 24). 
18 Act CXXVIII of 2011 on Disaster Protection and Amending Certain Related Laws, Subchapter 24. 
19 See id. 
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already-notorious human rights record into further turmoil; in discussing the new criminal laws, 
the bill’s vague language and its broad scope gives the government unchecked ability to 
restrict the rights of individuals and groups critical of the government. 
The Hungarian Constitution, known as the Fundamental Law, protects many of the rights 
threatened by T/9790, including freedom of expression and freedom of the press.20 The 
Fundamental Law, like ninety percent of the world’s constitutions, contains a provision on 
executing a state of emergency.21 Article 53 of the Fundamental Law asserts that the 
government has a right to rule by decree in a “state of danger,” a special legal order that allows 
the government to introduce extraordinary measures by decree and suspend certain laws in 
order to resolve the emergency.22 To guard against power vacuums, the Fundamental Law 
prescribes a fifteen-day effective period for orders by decree during a state of danger, after 
which only a parliamentary mandate can allow extensions.23 All emergency decrees are to 
expire once the crisis and the attendant state of danger are over.24 T/9790 bypasses these 
legal safeguards altogether by foregoing a sunset clause or any expiration measures. Under 
the Fundamental Law, Parliament must still maintain constitutional oversight and fulfill its 
normal functions during a special legal order,25 and any members of Parliament may initiate a 
constitutional review procedure by the Constitutional Court — a special court created solely 
to protect the rule of law, constitutional integrity, and the balance of power.26 In theory, 
Parliament and the Constitutional Court should act as counterbalances to the government during 
states of danger, in which the central government has extreme powers. This system of checks-and-
balances is unlikely to yield results, given Orbán’s tightening grasp on authoritarian-like 
command and that Parliament alone elects the members of the Constitutional Court.27 As one 
journalist noted: 
the [C]onstitutional [C]ourt could theoretically overrule the decisions 
implemented during the state of emergency, but given that its rights have been 
curbed and it has been stuffed with pro-government loyalists in recent years, 
we cannot expect that it will serve as an effective counterweight to the 
cabinet’s power. Likewise, although the parliament could officially terminate 
the state of emergency, it won’t. Orbán’s Fidesz-KDNP has a comfortable and 
loyal majority; there has been not a single case in the past 10 years when 
Fidesz MPs have not supported a governmental decision.28  
20 MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE, THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY, ALAPTÖRVÉNY.  
21 M.A., supra note 1; Christain Bjørnskov & Stefan Voigt, The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions, 16 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 101, 101 (2018). 




26 Id.; EUR. L. INST., The Constitutional Court of Hungary, https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/membership/institu
tional-members/the-constitutional-court-of-hungary/ (last visited June 14, 2020). 
27 EUR. L. INST., supra note 26. 
28 Péter Krekó, The World Must Not Let Viktor Orbán Get Away with His Pandemic Power-
Grab, THE GUARDIAN (April 1, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/01/viktor-orban-
pandemic-power-grab-hungary.  
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While the Constitutional Court may offer little hope of enforcing the Fundamental Law’s 
provisions, the Fundamental Law explicitly enumerates some non-derogable rights. Article 54 lists 
two groups of rights not subject to derogation under a state of danger.29 The first group protects 
the right to life and human dignity, preserving life at the point of conception.30 The second group 
protects against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, enslavement, human trafficking, non-
consensual scientific experimentation, selling human body parts, eugenics, and human cloning.31 
The Fundamental Law enumerates other rights considered essential in international law, but none 
of those are protected as non-derogable rights under Article 54. These include freedom of the 
press,32 freedom of expression,33 freedom to peacefully gather,34 and freedom to peacefully join 
organizations.35  
Hungary has an obligation to protect these non-derogable rights under international law. 
International law — through conventions, treaties, and customary law — protects these rights as 
fundamental to the preservation of human dignity.36 Orbán has implemented T/9790 as a simple 
pretext, using the threat of a pandemic to justify the careful erosion of human rights, ultimately 
securing unchecked governmental control. Under neither international law nor its own constitution 
has Hungary adequately balanced its dual responsibilities of protecting public health and 
safeguarding human rights by implementing T/9790. International law prescribes the proper 
method for invoking a state of emergency and further protects inalienable rights from derogation 
under such state.37 T/9790, with its ambiguous directives and sweeping criminal consequences, 
deviates severely from both establishing a proper state of emergency and protecting human rights 
during its state of danger. 
Three principal elements unify nearly all international law regarding the declaration of states of 
emergency that require a derogation from certain rights: necessity, proportionality, and duration.38 
First, it must be necessary to restrict certain rights given the nature of the emergency. Article 15 
of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates that Hungary may take some measures 
to curtail certain human rights obligations during a “public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation,” but rights derogations must not exceed “the extent strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation” and must also comply with Hungary’s other international human rights obligations.39 
For a state facing relatively small numbers of infection and a history of ruling by decree, 







36 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter “ICCPR”] arts. 4(2), 8, 11, 15, 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171; European Convention on Human Rights [hereinafter “ECHR”] art. 15(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
37 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 36, at 174; ECHR, supra note 36, at 232. 
38 U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of 
Emergency, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 11 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
39 ECHR Art. 15(1); see also European Social Charter, art. 30, October 18, 1961, E.T.S. No. 035; European Social 
Charter (revised), Part V, art. F, March 5, 1996, E.T.S. No. 163. 
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criminalizing the freedom of expression and the freedom of the press is an extreme and undue 
response clearly invoked to further political agenda. As mandated by the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, Hungary must periodically review whether the public health crisis 
continues to necessitate the declared state of danger, and whether the strict measures in place to 
contain the virus’s spread can be loosened or withdrawn completely.40 The process of determining 
the necessity of rights derogations during an ongoing emergency should include meaningful 
scrutiny by multiple branches of government.41 
 
Second, the derogation of rights must be proportional to the needs of the emergency situation.42 
Similarly, the erosion of such basic human rights is disproportionate to the needs of the emergency 
in Hungary. António Guterres, the Secretary General of the United Nations, asserted in a recent 
speech that “no one during this pandemic can take the place of the media to transmit information 
and analysis to the public, and to counter rumors and misrepresentation.”43 The media itself is 
necessary to fight the pandemic — limiting its reach is incongruent with the stated mission of 
T/9790.44 Finally, the principle of duration holds that a state of emergency should only continue 
so long as the emergency itself persists. As stated in ICCPR General Comment No. 29, “the 
restoration of a state of normalcy where full respect for the Covenant can again be secured must 
be the predominant objective of a State party derogating from the Covenant.”45 T/9790’s lack of 
durational limitations contradict the standards of international law as well as Hungary’s 
constitutional requirement.46 Whenever a state of emergency lacks one of these essential elements 
in international law, international legal enforcement bodies must judge the actions of the 
government in question in light of its ordinary treaty obligations rather than through the special 
lens of a legitimate state of emergency. Governments cannot escape treaty obligations at will; the 
right to derogate is circumscribed by several conditions: “[f]undamental safeguards of the rule of 
law, in particular legality, effective parliamentary oversight, independent judicial control and 
effective domestic remedies, must be maintained during a state of emergency.”47 
 
Hungary has already acted under T/9790 and deprived individuals of their fundamental human 
rights. In April, the Hungarian public news broadcaster Híradó, a notoriously pro-government 
program, debuted a “fake news monitor” to disprove false information about the pandemic.48 Many 
 
40 Eur. Parl. Ass., State of Emergency: Proportionality Issues Concerning Derogations Under Article 15 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, ¶ 19.4, 2018 Ordinary Sess. (second sitting), Resolution 2209 (2018) 
[hereinafter “PACE”]. 
41 Id. ¶ 19.6. 
42 See, e.g., PACE Resolution 2209, supra note 40. 




44 Id. (“Journalists and media workers of all kinds are crucial to helping us make informed decisions. In a pandemic, 
those decisions can save lives.”). 
45 U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., supp. no. 40 at 202 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/56/40 (July 2001) (emphasis added). 
46 CCPR General Comment No. 29, supra note 38; M.A. 53(3). 
47 PACE Resolution 2209, ¶ 3, supra note 40. 
48 Justin Spike, COVID Pandemic Adds to Pressure on Hungarian Media, VOA NEWS (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.voanews.com/press-freedom/covid-pandemic-adds-pressure-hungarian-media.  
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of the issues targeted come from politicians opposing President Orbán or articles by news 
organizations that are critical of the government. The monitor demonstrates how Hungary has used 
the legitimate battle against coronavirus misinformation to mask its efforts to label watchdog 
journalism as “fake news.” In May, police used T/9790 to detain two men for "scaremongering" 
in social media posts that criticized the government. One of the men, Janos Csoka-Szucs, a member 
of the Hungarian Momentum Party, which opposes President Orbán, was interrogated for several 
hours while police seized his phone and computer.49 The growing animus toward non-government-
sponsored news outlets is emboldened by T/9790’s passage. As one Hungarian media researcher 
noted, “[t]he legitimate goal [of countering fake news] is being confused with incitement against 
journalists and opposition politicians, which is terribly dangerous.”50  
These incidents raise serious concerns in international law, which widely condemns any 
disintegration of the freedom of opinion and expression, the freedom of the press, and the fair 
application of the rule of law. The freedom of opinion and expression is considered a fundamental 
right under Article 18 of the ICCPR,51 Article 15 of the ICESCR,52 and Article 11 of the European 
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights,53 to all of which Hungary is a party.54 The freedom of the 
press is also protected under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, wherein 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers.”55 By criminalizing citizens who voice their own opinions and 
doubts through social media and journalism, T/9790 clearly infringes on individuals’ right to freely 
express their opinions “without interference,” as well as independent news organizations’ freedom 
to “impart information and ideas through any media.”56 
The arbitrary detention of Csoka-Szucs and the threatened detention of independent journalists 
across Hungary also illustrates derogation from another fundamental principle of international law: 
adherence to the established tenants of the rule of law during an emergency, including the right to 
a fair trial.57 The United Nations Human Rights Committee states in CCPR General Comment 29 
that arbitrary detentions, even for brief interrogations, infringe on the right to a fair trial.58 General 
49 Joanna Kakissis, European Parliament Lawmakers Demand Punishment for Hungary Over Emergency Powers, 
NPR (May 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/14/855918912/european-
parliament-lawmakers-demand-punishment-for-hungary-over-emergency-power. 
50 Id. 
51 ICCPR art. 18, supra note 36. 
52 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter “ICESCR”]. 
53 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 11(1), 2012 O.J. (C 326). [hereinafter “EUCFR”]. 
54 See also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
“UDHR”]. 
55 Id.; see also EUCFR art. 11(2), supra note 53. 
56 UDHR, supra note 54. 
57 Shaun Walker, Hungarian Journalists Fear Coronavirus Law May Be Used to Jail Them, THE GUARDIAN (April 
3, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/03/hungarian-journalists-fear-coronavirus-law-may-be-used-
to-jail-them.  
58 CCPR General Comment No. 29, ¶¶ 11, 16, supra note 38. 
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Comment 24 considers this principle to be customary international law.59 Additionally, Article 9 
of the ICCPR protects against arbitrary arrest and security of person, an obligation that T/9790 
fails to meet because its specious new crimes are vaguely-worded and violate other international 
legal rights.60 T/9790’s language criminalizing the “imparting or conveying [of] false information” 
that “obstructs or frustrates” the successful protection of the public does little to define how 
information is deemed false and what is considered an obstruction of the “successful protection” 
of the public.61 Further, the provision that criminalizes “interfere[nce] with quarantine 
enforcement” does not define what constitutes interference and does not elaborate on how such 
interference could be tied with the death of another person to attain the eight-year prison sentence, 
considering that the virus has a fourteen-day incubation period and could already have infected the 
deceased person.62 The fundamental requirements of the rule of law must be respected during a 
state of emergency — anyone detained, charged, or imprisoned under T/9790 is wrongly 
criminalized, as the criminal provisions of the law itself do not meet international standards during 
a state of emergency. 
 
The international community’s response to T/9790 has brought harsh criticism to Orbán’s 
leadership during the pandemic. European Union Parliament lawmakers have demanded official 
denunciation and punishment for Hungary over this law, with Hungarian members calling to slash 
Hungary’s EU funds.63 One Hungarian member of the European Parliament, who represents the 
country’s Momentum Party, charged Orbán with using the law as a smokescreen for consolidating 
authority: “[t]his law is meant to intimidate and silence dissenting voices because the prime 
minister is scared to lose his power.”64 Civil society in Hungary and around the world have 
sounded the alarm on the chilling effects of T/9790 on basic freedoms. In a joint statement, the 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Civil Liberties Union, Eötvös Károly Institute, and Amnesty 
International Hungary condemned the law, calling for domestic and international accountability 
measures.65 An online protest letter has garnered 100,000 signatures, and thousands have watched 
online protests.66 Other international institutions have criticized T/9790, including the UN Human 
 
59 Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification 
or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of 
the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 6 (Nov. 4, 1994). 
60 ICCPR art. 9, supra note 36; T/9790, supra note 3. 
61 T/9790, supra note 3. 
62 Id.; Interim Clinical Guidance for Management of Patients with Confirmed Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 CDC.gov, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidance-
management-patients.html (updated June 30, 2020). 
63 Joanna Kakissis, NPR, supra note 47. 
64 Id. 
65 Amnesty International Hungary, Eötvös Károly Institute, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union & Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, Unlimited Power Is Not the Panacea: Assessment of the Proposed Law to Extend the State of 
Emergency and Its Constitutional Preconditions, COVID-19, The Hungarian Helsinki Committee (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.helsinki.hu/en/unlimited-power-is-not-the-panacea/.  
66 Hungary: Government Must Not Use Extraordinary Power to Roll Back Human Rights Amid 
COVID-19 Emergency, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR2720
462020ENGLISH.PDF. 
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Rights Commissioner, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, the Civil Liberties 
Committee of the European Parliament, Reporters Without Borders, and Human Rights Watch.67 
 
Because Hungary has failed to meet the standard for derogation of rights during a state of 
emergency, treaty bodies should act as prescribed in their respective treaties for addressing 
aberrant behavior by member states. Moreover, detained Hungarians may bring grievances 
regarding their unlawful detention, as emphasized in the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment 29 and General Comment 35.68 
 
One venue for recourse could be the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). The ECtHR is 
empowered to rule on whether Hungary has gone beyond the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the crisis.69 When determining whether a state has gone beyond what the situation 
strictly requires, “the Court must give appropriate weight to such relevant factors such as the nature 
of the rights affected by the derogation, the circumstances leading to, and the duration of, the 
emergency situation.”70 The ECtHR has also charged domestic courts with the responsibility to 
carry the same analysis in similar cases, stating that national courts should scrutinize emergency 
measures by the executive and assess whether the measures taken are proportional to the nature of 
the threat posed by the emergency.71 
 
Because the Hungarian Parliament can no longer check the government’s actions, the 
Constitutional Court must intervene to quickly and constructively assess the constitutionality of 
any decisions made or individual measures taken pertaining to the state of emergency. Following 
the recommendations enumerated in the joint statement issued by civil society institutions, the 
measures to enable the Constitutional Court’s intervention should include (1) allowing any 
members of Parliament or the head of parliamentary groups to initiate a constitutional review 
process in the Court, and (2) shortening the deadlines by which the Constitutional Court must rule 
on petitions regarding T/9790 and any related measures.72 Additionally, the Court must exercise 
its authority to find that Parliament may only grant an extraordinary legal mandate to the 
government — such as T/9790 — for a predefined period of time so as to eliminate any threat of 
renewing a special legal order ad infinitum.  
 
Regardless of the recourse sought by affected Hungarians or concerned treaty bodies, no court or 
parliamentary body should be satisfied by Hungary’s recent attempt to assuage international 
criticism. Just before midnight on May 26, 2020, Hungary announced plans to revoke T/9790. 
However, the replacement law would implement nearly identical provisions as T/9790.73 While 
 
67 Id. 
68 Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4: States of Emergency, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 11 (Aug. 31, 2001); Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 35: Article 9: 
Liberty and Security of Person, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014). 
69 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 207 (1978). 
70 Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 258-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 43 (1993). 
71 A and others v. United Kingdom, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, ¶¶ 173-–74, 184 (2009). 
72 As permitted under M.A., 24(2)(g). cikk (Fundamental Law, art. 24(2)(g)). 
73 Lydia Gall, Ending Hungary’s State of Emergency Won’t End Authoritarianism, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 29, 
2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/29/ending-hungarys-state-emergency-wont-end-authoritarianism.  
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the government would formally end the state of emergency, the new bill would maintain Prime 
Minister Orbán’s power to rule by decree “for an undefined period of time with minimal judicial 
and parliamentary scrutiny.”74 In addition to its repetition of T/9790’s provisions, the bill would 
allow the government to declare a “state of medical emergency” via the Chief Medical Officer of 
the state, a position that is under government control.75 Such a declaration would, like any state of 
danger, give the government permission to curtail fundamental rights for six months, renewable 
indefinitely.76 Renewal would be entirely up to the government without parliamentary or judicial 
oversight.77 As the “little sister”78 law to T/9790, this bill would enact the same internationally-
illegal measures, simply under a different name. As Orbán told an interviewer in 2013, “in a crisis, 
you don’t need governance by institutions.”79 Under T/9790, and with international accountability 





77 Id.  
78 Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty International Hungary, Never-Ending 
Story: Rapid analysis of the Bill on Terminating the State of Danger (T/10747) & the Bill on Transitional Provisions 
related to the Termination of the State of Danger (T/10748), COVID-19, THE HUNGARIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE 
(May 27, 2020), https://www.helsinki.hu/en/never-ending-story/.  
79 James Kirchick, Europe’s Other Strongman, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2018), at A.17. 
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